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NEGOTIATING COMPETITION POLICY IN  
MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: 
EUROPEAN UNION OVERTURES  






Competition Policy1 has been proposed by the European Union 
(EU) as a subject-matter for inclusion in the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPA) that the EU is currently negotiating with the 
African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States. 2   An 
agreement in the EPAs covering competition would include not 
only the traditional prohibitions against agreements and practices 
in restraint of competition and monopolies and regulation of 
mergers,3 but also, as proposed by the EU, it would incorporate 
                                                     
*  LL.B. (Hons.), University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana; LL.M., Temple 
University School of Law, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; J.S.D., Stanford Law 
School, Stanford, California; Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law of 
Samford University, Birmingham, Alabama. 
1  Competition policy refers to the legislative framework or to the set of 
regulations which control practices by both private and public firms which are 
deemed to restrict competition in the market.  SOUTH CTR., COMPETITION POLICY IN 
ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS (CARIFORUM TEXT): FACT SHEET NO. 8, ¶ 4 
(2008) [hereinafter SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 8]. 
2  The European Union is negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) with 75 of its former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
(ACP).  SOUTH CTR., UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS 
(EPAS): FACT SHEET NO. 1, ¶ 1 (2007) [hereinafter SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 1].  
The EPAs are essentially free trade agreements (FTA) that envisage the creation of 
a free trade area between the EU and ACP countries.  Id.  A free trade refers to a 
group of countries that have eliminated tariff and most non-tariff barriers 
affecting trade among themselves, while each participating country applies its 
own independent schedule of tariffs to imports from countries that are not 
members.  See generally id.  
3  A basic competition law framework typically includes the following:  
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core principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO), such as 
transparency, non-discrimination, and procedural fairness.4 
Governments throughout the world have designed and 
implemented competition policies as fundamental instruments in 
the promotion of more transparent, more efficient, and more open 
markets as well as the promotion of consumer protection and 
welfare.5  There is the expectation that effective competition in the 
market place would result in the most effective use of national 
resources, provide incentives for innovation and enable consumers 
to benefit from lower prices, better quality and a variety of goods 
and services.6  In this context, therefore, competition policy can 
contribute to economic growth and thereby complement 
government policies aimed at poverty reduction.7 
However, despite the proliferation of national competition 
rules, 8  there are no legally binding international disciplines on 
competition policy.  Developing countries have vigorously 
opposed initiatives to create such frameworks fearing potential 
restrictions on their policy space to adopt appropriate strategies for 
development. 9   The small and vulnerable economies have also 
                                                     
[i] [t]he prohibition of cartels or agreements among rival firms to stop 
competing by fixing prices, allocating or sharing markets and fighting 
outsiders (non members of the cartel); [ii] [t]he control of vertical anti-
competitive practices and the prohibition of abuses of dominant market 
power by large firms or monopolies; [and] [iii] [t]he control and review 
of mergers and acquisitions which may lead to the creation of a 
dominant player in the market . . . .   
SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 8, supra note 1, ¶ 425.  A document prepared by the 
World Trade Organization lists the national laws on competition in force in more 
than 50 countries.  See Overview of Members’ National Competition Legislation, infra 
note 8, at 3–18.  
4  See infra notes 74–93 and accompanying text. 
5  SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 8, supra note 1, ¶ 5. 
6  John Preston, Implementing Competition Policy in Developing Countries: The 
Role of Donors, at 3 (Dec. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/80/Session3.4PrestonDoc.
pdf. 
7  Id. at 3. 
8  For an outline of national competition laws, see Working Group on the 
Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, Note by the Secretariat: 
Overview of Members’ National Competition Legislation, WT/WGTCP/W/128/Rev.3 
(Nov. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Overview of Members’ National Competition Legislation], 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/wgtcp_docs.e.htm. 
9  Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, 
Background Note by the Secretariat: Core Principles, Including Transparency, Non-
Discrimination and Procedural Fairness, WT/WGTCP/W/209, ¶ 31 (Sept. 19, 2002).  
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been concerned about the challenges the proposed disciplines 
would create, particularly regarding the heavy costs of 
implementing and enforcing them. 10  This Article examines the 
debate on international competition policy in the context of the 
negotiations of the EPA between the EU and West Africa. 
Section One of the Article identifies as background 
information, the basic goals of competition policy.  Section Two 
traces how the subject of competition was introduced in 
international trade negotiations while Section Three discusses the 
implications of a multilateral agreement on competition policy 
proposed by the EU in the WTO and based on principles of 
transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness.  A 
description in Section Four of the discussions on competition 
policy in the context of the EPA negotiations with West Africa is 
followed in Section Five with an examination of alternative 
regional schemes with special reference to the ECOWAS 
Supplementary Act on Competition Rules. 
 
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON COMPETITION 
POLICY 
1.1. The Goals of Competition Policy 
 
The most basic goals of competition policy are to promote and 
maintain healthy inter-firm rivalry in markets11 by regulating anti-
competitive market structures and enterprise activities that impede 
circulation 12  and also promote consumer welfare by regulating 
practices or structures that could have a detrimental impact on the 
                                                     
See also Martin Khor, Analysis of the Doha Negotiations and the Functioning of the 
World Trade Organization 16 (South Ctr., Research Paper No. 30, May 2010) 
(observing that “[i]n December 2003, several leading developing countries 
proposed to the WTO . . . that . . . the three issues of investment, competition, and 
government procurement . . . be dropped from the Doha agenda”). 
10  Martin Khor, The “Singapore Issues” in the WTO: Implications and Recent 
Developments, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (2004), at 5, available at 
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01284/_res/id=s
a_File1/. 
11  See generally MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(2004). 
12  Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, 
Background Note by the Secretariat: The Fundamental Principles of Competition Policy, 
WT/WGTCP/W/127, at 5 (June 7, 1999) [hereinafter Fundamental Principles]. 
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prices charged to and/or the array of choices available to 
consumers. 13   A third major goal aims at the promotion of 
economic efficiency 14  in the sense of allocative efficiency, 15 
productive efficiency or dynamic efficiency.16 
Other secondary goals reflected in varying degrees in some 
competition laws and policies include the promotion of equity and 
fairness, the promotion of opportunities for small and medium-
sized businesses, market integration, promotion of technological 
development, local production and employment, and the 
protection of economic and political pluralism.17 
  By advancing these objectives, competition policy would 
contribute to the overall process of economic development and 
poverty alleviation.  For example, this could result from promoting 
an efficient allocation of resources, 18  protecting the welfare of 
consumers, 19  preventing or addressing excessive concentration 
levels and resulting structural rigidities, 20  and addressing anti-
competitive practices of enterprises that have a trade dimension.21  
Economic development would also be enhanced under 
competition policy by increasing the economy’s ability to attract 
foreign investment and to maximize the benefits of such 
                                                     
13  Id. 
14  Id. ¶ 18. 
15  See WTO, Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and 
Competition Policy, Note by the Secretariat: Study on Issues Relating to a Possible 
Multilateral Framework on Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/228, ¶¶ 16–18 (May 
19, 2003) (Part I) (discussing the different types of efficiency and defining 
allocative efficiency).  “’Allocative efficiency’ is achieved when society’s scarce 
resources are allocated to produce the goods and services that are most desired by 
consumers.  This requires that price be equal to the marginal costs of production 
and distribution from the social point of view.”  Fundamental Principles, supra note 
12, ¶ 11. 
16  “’Productive efficiency’ is achieved when goods are produced using the 
most cost-effective combination of productive resources available under existing 
technology.  ‘Dynamic efficiency’ is achieved through an optimal rate of 
invention, development, and diffusion of new products and production 
processes.”  Fundamental Principles, supra note 12, ¶ 17 (citation omitted). 
17  Id. ¶ 20. 
18  See generally Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and 
Competition Policy, Note by the Secretariat: Synthesis Paper on the Relationship of 
Trade and Competition Policy to Development and Economic Growth, 
WT/WGTCP/W/80, ¶ 9 (Sept. 18, 1998).  See generally Fundamental Principles, 
supra note 12, ¶ 19. 
19  Id. ¶ 9. 
20  Id. ¶ 11. 
21  Id. ¶ 12. 
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investment, 22  reinforcing the benefits of privatization and 
regulatory reform or deregulation initiatives,23 and establishing an 
institutional focal point for the advocacy of pro-competitive policy 
reforms and a competition culture.24  
Given the potential welfare benefits of competition policy, it is 
not surprising that competition rules have mushroomed and are 
now a staple of the business laws in many jurisdictions. 25  
Provisions on competition can also be found in numerous bilateral 
agreements and regional free trade agreements.26  However, the 
goal of the international community to develop a global instrument 
has proved to be elusive, as described in the next section. 
 
2. INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES ON COMPETITION 
POLICY:  FROM HAVANA TO CANCUN 
2.1. The Havana Charter 
 
The earliest major multilateral trade instrument to contain 
references to competition policy was the Havana Charter signed in 
March 1948 by some fifty-three countries setting up the 
International Trade Organization (ITO).27  During negotiations on 
                                                     
22  Id. ¶¶ 18–20. 
23  Id. ¶¶ 1–26. 
24  Id. ¶ 27. 
25  Overview of Members’ National Competition Legislation, supra note 8. 
26  See e.g., UNCTAD, COMPETITION PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: HOW TO ASSURE DEVELOPMENT GAINS (Philippe Brusick et al. eds., 
2005), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditcclp20051_en.pdf (analyzing 
provisions found in different types of RTAs, and making a number of policy 
recommendations and identifying institutional arrangements needed to promote 
synergies between trade and competition at the regional level); Sanoussi Bilal, 
Trade and Competition Policy: Perspectives for Developing Countries 7 (2001), available 
at http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-
opinion-files/4709.pdf (reviewing the current debate on competition policy, 
analyzing the implementation and enforcement capacity of developing countries, 
and assessing the relevance of a global competition policy framework for 
developing countries). 
27  The Havana Charter incorporated special provisions to enhance the 
contribution of investment to economic development.  For example, Article 12 of 
the Havana Charter captioned “International Investment for Economic 
Development and Reconstruction” provided that “international investment, both 
public and private, can be of great value in promoting economic development and 
reconstruction, and consequent social progress,” and that “the international flow 
of capital will be stimulated to the extent that Members afford nationals of other 
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the Havana Charter, the United States had argued for a 
“multilateral code focussed on protecting foreign investment from 
discrimination and nationalization by host countries.”28  However, 
many of the developing countries – the majority of them now 
classified as developed countries 29 – opposed this, fearing their 
sovereignty would be compromised under the proposed code.  
In the end, the Havana Charter provided for the right of each 
member to “determine whether and to what extent and upon what 
terms it will allow future foreign investment”30 and to “take any 
appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure that foreign investment 
is not used as a basis for interference in [a country’s] internal 
affairs.”31  It also recognized the right of Member States to take 
action by statute or decree to prevent restrictive business practices 
including monopolies or restraints of trade. 32  Significantly, the 
Havana Charter did not prohibit discrimination against foreign 
direct investment, merely requiring that States “give due regard to 
                                                     
countries opportunities for investment and security for existing and future 
investments.”  Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization art. 12, 
Mar. 24, 1948, in U.N. Conference on Trade & Employment, Final Act and Related 
Documents 8–9, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 [hereinafter Havana Charter], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf. 
28  Riyaz Dattu, A Journey from Havana to Paris: The Fifty-Year Quest for the 
Elusive Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 275, 287, 291–92 
(2000). 
29  As one author explains,  
by this time, the hitherto great world powers such as the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany had ceased to be capital exporting 
countries and were faced with an upsurge in American foreign 
investment after the war.  They therefore had to erect, or leave space for, 
formal and informal mechanisms to ensure that their national interests 
were protected.  During this time the formal mechanisms that these 
countries used included foreign exchange controls and regulations 
against foreign investment in sensitive sectors, such as defense and 
cultural industries.  Informally, they used mechanisms such as ‘takeover 
restrictions, undertakings and voluntary restrictions by transnational 
corporations in order to restrict foreign investment and impose 
performance requirements.’ 
Victor Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral 
Framework on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?, 26 NW. 
J. INT.’L  & BUS. 95, 109 (2005) (footnotes omitted). 
30  Havana Charter, supra note 27, art. 12(1)(c)(iii). 
31  Id. arts. 12(1)(c)(ii), 12(1)(c)(i). 
32  Article 52, entitled “Domestic Measures against Restrictive Business 
Practices,” provides that “[n]o act or omission to act on the part of the 
Organization shall preclude any Member from enforcing any national statute or 
decree directed towards preventing monopoly or restraint of trade.”  Id. art. 52. 
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the desirability of avoiding discrimination as between foreign 
investments.” 33   There was also no obligation for national 
treatment or right of establishment in the ITO provisions, and 
neither did the provisions cover investment incentives or 
performance requirements.34 
However, the provisions on competition in the Havana 
Charter, limited as they were, never entered into force.  Other parts 
of the Charter, including provisions that envisaged strong 
enforcement powers for the ITO, had raised concerns in the US, 
and the United States Congress rejected the Charter.35  Without 
American support, the ITO was doomed36 and the Havana Charter 
that sought to create it never came into effect except for the trade 
provisions of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which were 
applied on a provisional basis until the establishment in 1994 of the 
WTO.37 
 
2.2. UNCTAD’s Work Program 
 
Under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, the international community engaged in 
protracted negotiations during the 1970s and 1980s on a Code of 
Conduct for Transnational Corporations (TNCs). 38   The 
formulation of such a code39 was part of a plan to establish a New 
                                                     
33  Id. art. 12, ¶ 2(a)(ii). 
34  EDWARD M. GRAHAM, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 
101 (1996). 
35  Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jisun Kim, International Competition Policy and the 
WTO, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (2008), available at 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=930. 
36  PAUL B. STEPHAN, DON WALLACE, JR. & JULIE A. ROIN, INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND POLICY 74 (2d ed. 1996), available at 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=930. 
37  LUISA E. BERNAL ET AL., THE DOHA TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES: THE INVESTMENT AGENDA AND THE SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS IN THE 
WTO, ¶ 22 (2003). 
38 UNCTC Origins, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
[UNCTAD], http://unctc.unctad.org/aspx/UNCTCOrigins.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2014) (noting that the development of the Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations was one of the four main tasks comprising 
UNCTAD’s work program). 
39  Draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, May 1983, 23 
I.L.M. 626 (1984) [hereinafter Draft UN Code], available at 
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International Economic Order centered on “controlling the political 
[and] economic activities of TNCs, out of the concern of developing 
countries about their sovereignty.” 40  The draft Code contained 
provisions on competition and restrictive business practices.41  
However, the negotiations were hampered by a climate of 
confrontation and mistrust42 and differing perspectives about the 
objectives, nature and scope of the proposed Code.  While the 
developing countries argued for a binding code, the developed 
countries preferred an instrument containing non-binding 
guidelines.43  It was also difficult to develop a consensus on how to 
treat the transnational corporations, 44  especially as regards the 
power of States to regulate their rights of entry and 
establishment, 45  to nationalize their interests and the scope of 
compensation payable 46  as well as to subject them to national 
dispute settlement procedures.47  According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 1980s 
witnessed a change in its focus to the positive, rather than the 
negative, effects of foreign direct investment and TNCs and that 
such change in attitude “contributed to the stalling of the Code 
negotiations . . . .”48  In the end, there was no agreement and the 
draft code was shelved. 
                                                     
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2891 (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2015). 
40 UNCTC Evolution, UNCTAD, available at 
http://unctc.unctad.org/aspx/UNCTCEvolution.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).   
41  Draft UN Code, supra note 39, ¶ 35. 
42  UNCTC Evolution, supra note 40. 
43  The text of the draft Code reveals this tension.  Many of the obligations to 
be imposed on transnational corporations offer two alternatives: “shall” or 
“should,” denoting binding and non-binding obligations, respectively.  See, e.g., 
Draft UN Code, supra note 39, ¶ 45:  
Transnational corporations should/shall supply to the competent 
authorities in each of the countries in which they operate, upon request 
or on a regular basis as specified by those authorities, and in accordance 
with national legislation, all information required for legislative and 
administrative purposes relevant to the activities and policies of their 
entities in the country concerned. 
44  Paul Kuruk, Controls on Technology Transfer: An Analysis of the Southern 
Response to Northern Technological Protectionism, 13 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 301, 320 
(1989).  
45 Draft U.N. Code, supra note 39, ¶ 47. 
46 Id. ¶ 54. 
47 Id. ¶¶ 55–58. 
48 UNCTC Evolution, supra note 40. 
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Although UNCTAD failed in its bid to develop a code of 
conduct for TNCs, it was successful in developing the Set of 
Multilaterally Approved Equitable Principles and Rules for the 
Control of Restrictive Business Practices (Set of Principles).49  The 
UN General Assembly adopted the instrument on December 5, 
1980. 
Objectives of the Set of Principles are stated to include the 
attainment of  
 
greater efficiency in international trade and development . . 
. through . . . [t]he creation, encouragement and protection 
of competition; [the] [c]ontrol of the concentration of capital 
and/or economic power; [and the] [e]ncouragement of 
innovation.”50  Additional objectives include the promotion 
of social welfare and the interests of consumers;51 and the 
“eliminat[ion of] the disadvantages to trade and 
development which may result from the restrictive business 
practices of transnational corporations.52 
 
The Set of Principles defines restrictive business practices as: 
 
acts or behaviour of enterprises which, through an abuse or 
acquisition and abuse of a dominant position of market 
power, limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain 
competition, having or being likely to have adverse effects 
on international trade, particularly that of developing 
countries, . . . or which through formal, informal, written or 
unwritten agreements or arrangements among enterprises, 
have the same impact.53 
 
Restrictive business practices specifically condemned include 
                                                     
49 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The United 
Nations Set of Principles and Rules on Competition, U.N. Doc. 
TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.2 (2000), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf10r2.en.pdf. 
50 Id. at A2(a)-(c). 
51  Id. at A3.  
52  Id. at A4. 
53  Id. at B(i)(1). 
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price-fixing agreements, collusive tendering, market or customer 
allocation arrangements 54  and predatory behavior towards 
competitors.55 
While the adoption of the Set of Principles marked an 
important milestone in the efforts to develop a multilateral 
framework on competition policy, the non-binding nature of the 
instrument has limited its usefulness.  As noted in its preamble, the 
principles “take the form of recommendations” 56  only, and 
therefore are hortatory, and not intended to create directly 
enforceable rights and obligations. 
    
2.3. WTO Ministerial Conferences 
 
At the first session of the WTO ministerial conference held in 
Singapore in 1996, some members called for negotiations in the 
WTO for agreements on competition policy,57 a request which the 
developing countries opposed.58  As a compromise, the Singapore 
Ministerial created 59  the Working Group on the Interaction 
Between Trade and Competition Policy (Working Group on 
Competition Policy) “to study issues raised by Members relating to 
the interaction between trade and competition policy, including 
anti-competitive practices, in order to identify any areas that may 
merit further consideration in the WTO framework.” 60   The 
Ministers directed the General Council to monitor the work under 
review for two years before determining “how the work of [the] 
                                                     
54  Id. at D3(a), (b), (c). 
55  Id. at D4. 
56  Id. at 9. 
57  Initial proposals for a WTO framework on competition came from the 
European Union and the United States.  See Khor, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that 
despite a lack of consensus, “the four Singapore issues were brought onto the 
Singapore Ministerial agenda through the device of a cover letter written by the 
WTO Director General to the Trade Ministers”). 
58  India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Tanzania were among the developing 
countries that opposed the initiatives on international competition policy.  Id.  
59  World Trade Org., Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996, 
WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 36 I.L.M. 218, ¶ 20 (1997)  [hereinafter Singapore Ministerial 
Declaration], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm. 
60  Id. ¶ 20.  
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body should proceed.”61  However, they underscored their clear 
understanding “that future negotiations, if any, regarding 
multilateral disciplines in these areas, will take place only after an 
explicit consensus decision is taken among WTO Members 
regarding such negotiations.”62 
The declaration issued at the next ministerial conference in 
Geneva63 on May 20, 1998 did not contain specific references to 
competition policy, although it called for recommendations to 
ensure expeditious conclusion of the work program set out during 
the Singapore conference.64  In the lead up to the Third Ministerial 
conference in Seattle, concrete proposals for the launching of WTO 
negotiations on competition policy were submitted in July and 
August 1999 by several countries.  Despite protracted discussions, 
the conference was unable to narrow gaps that had emerged on a 
number of critical issues and the Ministers resolved to “’take a time 
out, consult with one another, and find creative means to finish the 
job’” of the conference.65  As a result, no concrete decisions were 
taken in Seattle with respect to future work on competition policy 
in the WTO.  
At the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, however, the 
Ministers on November 14, 2001 “[r]ecogniz[ed] the case for a 
multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of competition 
policy to international trade and development, and the need for 
enhanced technical assistance and capacity-building in this area.”66  
                                                     
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
63  World Trade Org., Geneva Ministerial Declaration of 20 May 1998, 
available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min98_e/mindec_e.htm. 
64  The General Council’s work program included recommendations 
concerning “other possible future work on the basis of the work programme 
initiated at Singapore.”  Id. ¶ 9(b).  Specifically, the Ministers required the General 
Council to submit at the third session of the ministerial conference “on the basis of 
consensus, recommendations for decision concerning the further organization and 
management of the work programme arising from [the terms of the declaration], 
including the scope, structure and time-frames, that will ensure that the work 
programme is begun and concluded expeditiously.”  Id. ¶ 10. 
65  See Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Briefing Note: 3 December—
The Final Day and What Happens Next (Dec. 3, 1999), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/about_e/re
sum03_e.htm (quoting a statement by Conference Chairperson Charlene 
Barshefsky, who also noted the difficulties presented by the differences of 
opinion). 
66  World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
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They agreed that negotiations would take place after the next 
ministerial conference “on the basis of a decision to be taken, by 
explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations.”67  
The Ministers instructed the Working Group on Competition 
Policy to focus until the next ministerial conference “on 
clarification of:  core principles, including transparency, non-
discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hard 
core cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for 
progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in 
developing countries through capacity building.”68  The Working 
Group on Competition Policy was also to take “[f]ull account . . . of 
the needs of developing and least-developed country participants 
and [provide] appropriate flexibility . . . to address them.”69 
Even after the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun in 2003, 
there was still no consensus on modalities for negotiations on 
competition policy, although the Ministers had reaffirmed their 
“Doha Declarations and Decisions and recommit[ted themselves] 
to working to implement them fully and faithfully.” 70   The 
Chairperson of the conference noted on September 14, 2003 that 
despite considerable movement in consultations, members 
remained entrenched particularly on the Singapore issues, such as 
competition.71 
Shortly after, some WTO members moved that the issue of 
competition be dropped from the Doha agenda.72  On August 1, 
2004, the WTO General Council decided that competition policy 
“will not form part of the Work Programme set out in that 
Declaration and therefore no work towards negotiations 
                                                     
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, ¶ 23 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Doha 
Declaration], available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.  
67  Id. ¶ 20.  
68  Id. ¶ 25. 
69  Id. ¶ 25. 
70  World Trade Org., Cancun Ministerial Conference Summary of 14 
September 2003, ¶ 6, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.ht 
m#statement (last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
71  World Trade Org., Cancun Ministerial Statement, WT/MIN(03)/20, 
available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_e.htm (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
72  Khor, supra note 9, at 16. 
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on . . .[that] issue[] will take place within the WTO during the Doha 
Round.” 73   Accordingly, the Working Group on Competition 
Policy ceased to be active. 
 
3. IMPLICATIONS OF A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK 
ON COMPETITION POLICY 
3.1. EU Proposals Regarding a Multilateral Framework on 
Competition 
 
The EU was the principal proponent in the WTO for the 
adoption of a multilateral framework on competition. 74   In 
submissions to the Working Group on Competition Policy, the EU 
proposed elements of a multilateral framework based on core 
principles, cooperation and support for developing countries. 75  
Specifically,  
 
WTO negotiations on competition should . . . [focus] on 
three key issues:  core principles on domestic competition 
law and policy; cooperation modalities, including both 
case-specific cooperation and more general exchanges of 
experiences; and support for the reinforcement of 
competition institutions in developing countries, including 
through a more coherent and enhanced approach to 
technical assistance for capacity building.”76 
 
Regarding the core principles, the EU explained that they 
“would relate to the domestic legislative framework”77 and “could 
                                                     
73  See Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 
1 August 2004, WT/L/579, ¶ 1(g), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm. 
74  Julien Moiroux, The Internationalisation of Competition Policy: The EU and the 
WTO Between Boldness and Rally, 2 GLOBAL ANTITRUST REV. 38, 38 (2009). 
75  Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, 
Communication from the European Community and Its Member States, 
WT/WGTCP/W/152 (Sept. 25, 2000), at 5 [hereinafter Communication from the 
European Community (Sept. 25, 2000)], available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search.S.S001.aspx. 
76  Id. at 4. 
77  Id. at 5. 
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be largely based on transparency and non-discrimination.”  The 
EU argued the core principles were “both central to the 
multilateral trading system and to domestic competition law 
regimes.”78  Elaborating on these concepts, the EU contended that 
“competition law should be based on the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of the nationality of firms” (emphasis 
added),79 a view it considered to be self-evident: 
 
[t]he importance of non-discrimination – both MFN and 
National Treatment – for both the multilateral trading 
system and national competition laws hardly needs 
stressing.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any situation in 
which a competition law regime would establish any 
distinction on the basis of the nationality of firms.80 
 
Thus, application of the principle of non-discrimination in the 
context of competition law and policy “would mean an obligation 
not to formally discriminate against firms on the basis of their 
corporate nationality.”81  The EU argued that the prevalence of 
unique discriminatory treatment, such as discriminatory use of 
taxation, justified the “inclusion of the principle of non-
discrimination in a WTO framework agreement on competition by 
way of a separate, specific provision . . . [to] take into account the 
particularities of competition law and policy.” 82   Although 
competition-related provisions already exist in other WTO 
agreements,83 the EU contended they were too “area and/or issue 
                                                     
78  Id. 
79  Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
80  Id.  
81  Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, 
Communication from the European Community and Its Member States, 
WT/WGTCP/W/160 (Mar. 14, 2001), at 2 [hereinafter Communication from the 
European Community (Mar. 14, 2001)], available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_S_S001.aspx. 
82  Id. 
83  For example, both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contain rules on 
monopolies and exclusive service suppliers while the Agreement on the Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) recognizes the right of 
governments to act against anti-competitive practices.  See Understanding the WTO: 
Cross-Cutting and New Issues: Investment, Competition, Procurement, Simpler 
Procedures, WORLD TRADE ORG., available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey3_e.htm 
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specific” 84  to be useful in tackling competition issues with 
international dimensions.  
In terms of scope, the principle of transparency would apply to 
laws, regulations and other government measures taken in 
application of domestic competition law, including “not only to 
publications of relevant laws and regulations, but also, perhaps 
more importantly, to guidelines, as appropriate, for their future 
application and interpretation, as well as possible exclusions and 
exemptions.”85 
It would also extend to notions of “due process” and the 
availability of effective domestic remedies 86  and in that sense 
would include “procedures through which private parties can have 
access to the competition authorities, guarantees of due process in 
competition investigations and enforcement, basic standards of 
protection of confidential information, a right of appeal against 
administrative decisions and the role of the judiciary in the 
enforcement process.” 87   Because the due process guarantees 
resemble requirements of the principle of procedural fairness, they 





                                                     
(last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
84  As the EU argues,  
despite the competition-related provisions in a number of existing WTO 
agreements such as TRIPS and GATS (including the reference paper on 
basic telecommunications), all of these are area and/or issue-specific.  
The globalisation of our economy calls for a horizontal, generally 
applicable framework.  Clearly, principles on interconnection for 
telecommunication would alone offer little help in tackling international 
cartels.   
Communication from the European Community (Mar. 14, 2001), supra note 81, at 2. 
85  Id.  For a survey of exemptions and exclusions in national laws, see 
generally Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition 
Policy, Note by Secretariat: Exceptions, Exemptions and Exclusions Contained in 
Members’ National Competition Legislation, WT/WGTCP/W/172 (July 6, 2001). 
86  Communication from the European Community (Sept. 25, 2000), supra note 75, 
at 7. 
87  Id. 
88  Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, 
Provisions on Procedural Fairness in Existing WTO Agreements: Background Note by 
the Secretariat, ¶ 16, WT/WGTCP/W/231 (May 22, 2003) [hereinafter Provisions on 
Procedural Fairness in Existing WTO Agreements].  
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Underscoring the relevance of the core principles, the EU noted 
that  
 
they ensure a level playing field and equal competitive 
opportunities for firms, their products and services, and 
help bring about a higher degree of predictability to enable 
firms to familiarise themselves with existing rules and 
regulations before making major business decisions, just as 
consumers may become more familiar with their rights.89   
 
Specifically, they will ensure “a level playing field between domestic 
and foreign operators (and their goods and services) as well as between 
all foreign operators.”90 (Emphasis added).  
According to the EU, “affirming such principles as WTO 
commitments would reinforce their value in the domestic legal 
system and establish a stronger basis for mutual trust and 
cooperation among competition authorities.”91  In addition, “for 
those WTO Members who have not yet adopted domestic 
competition laws, a WTO agreement would provide important 
principles to be incorporated in the drafting of domestic 
competition law.”92  Furthermore, “a WTO Agreement would help 
lock Members into the principles of transparency and non-
discrimination, making their legal regimes transparent and 
predictable and limiting the possibility of recourse to formal 
discriminatory treatment at a later point in time.”93 
 
3.2. The WTO Principles of Non-Discrimination, Transparency 
and Procedural Fairness 
 
As noted by the EU, the principles of non-discrimination 
(national treatment and most favored nation treatment) and 
                                                     
89  Communication from the European Community (Mar. 14, 2001), supra note 81, 
at 2. 
90  Id. (emphasis added). 
91  Id. at 3. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
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transparency constitute core principles of the WTO.94  For example, 
the principle of national treatment is found in the three main WTO 
agreements dealing with trade in goods,95 trade in services,96 and 
intellectual property rights,97 as well as other agreements that form 
annexes to the WTO Agreement.98  In each agreement, the national 
treatment principle is expressed in terms of a no less favorable 
treatment standard as exemplified by the language in GATT 
Article III(4): 
 
The products of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party 
shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all 
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution 
or use.99 
                                                     
94  For example, in their directives to the Working Group on Competition 
Policy, the Ministers at the Doha Ministerial Conference referred to the need to 
“focus on the clarification of [the] core principles, including transparency, non-
discrimination and procedural fairness.”  Doha Declaration, supra note 66, ¶ 25. 
95  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. III, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm.  Of particular 
relevance is Article III, which requires national treatment in respect of all laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of goods. 
96  Agreement on Trade in Services art. XVII, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
183, 33 I.L.M. 1167, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-
gats.pdf. 
97  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 3, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm. 
98  These include Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Dec. 15, 1993, 
1868 U.N.T.S. 120, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-
tbt.pdf; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Dec. 15, 1993, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm; and the Agreement 
on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 508, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_01_e.htm. 
99  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III(4), Oct. 30, 1947, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194. 
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Therefore, the principle of national treatment imposes on a 
WTO Member an obligation not to put the goods or services or 
persons of other WTO Members at a competitive disadvantage vis-
a-vis its own goods or services or nationals.  However, it does not 
preclude the WTO Member from granting to foreign goods and 
services terms that are more favorable than are given to domestic 
goods and services.100  
Similarly, the principle of the most-favored-nation treatment 
requires a WTO Member not to discriminate between other WTO 
Members.  It is also reflected in the three main WTO agreements,101 
but in varying language.  While two of the agreements use 
traditional language in referring to the obligation to extend 
“immediately and unconditionally” to all WTO Members “any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” granted by a 
Member, 102  the third uses a “treatment no less favourable” 
standard for expressing its most favored nation obligation.103  
The concept of transparency as a core principle of the WTO has 
two key components.  First is the obligation to publish, or at least 
make publicly available, all relevant regulations, and, as a general 
rule, not to apply or enforce them until this has been done.104  
                                                     
100  Explaining the term “national treatment” with reference to section 337 of 
the US Tariff Act of 1930, a WTO publication notes: 
The words ‘treatment no less favourable’ in paragraph 4 call for effective 
equality of opportunities for imported products in respect of the 
application of laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal 
sale, . . . purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products.  This 
clearly sets a minimum permissible standard as a basis.  On the other 
hand, contracting parties may apply to imported products different 
formal legal requirements if doing so would accord imported products 
more favourable treatment.   
Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, 
Background Note by the Secretariat: The Fundamental WTO Principles of National 
Treatment, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment and Transparency, 
WT/WGTCP/W/114, ¶ 31 (Apr. 14, 1999) [hereinafter The Fundamental WTO 
Principles of National Treatment]. 
101  Provisions requiring a WTO Member not to discriminate between other 
WTO Members can be found in other agreements relating to trade in goods that 
form part of Annex IA of the WTO Agreement. 
102  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
supra note 97, art. 4; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, supra note 95, 
art. I. 
103  Agreement on Trade in Services, supra note 96, art. II. 
104  With regard to publication, the provisions of the three main WTO 
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Often linked to this is the obligation to provide for the impartial 
administration of such regulations and the right of review of 
decisions taken under them.105  The second component comprises 
provisions on the notification of various forms of governmental 
action to the WTO and other Members.106   
The term “procedural fairness” is not defined in any WTO 
agreement. 107   However, many of its requirements are closely 
related to the principle of transparency. 108   The principle of 
                                                     
Agreements containing this obligation are: (i) General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, supra note 95, art. X; (ii) Agreement on Trade in Services, supra note 96, art. 
III; (iii) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra 
note 97, art. 63.  Many of the other agreements that make up Annex IA of the 
WTO Agreement, relating to trade in goods, also contain a publication obligation.  
See generally Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf. 
105  Article X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade contains 
provisions on the uniform, impartial and reasonable administration of trade 
measures and the right of review of action taken pursuant to them.  Provisions of 
this nature can be found in many other WTO Agreements, including the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (in particular Article VI), the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (in particular Articles 41–42 and 
62) and in various Annex IA Agreements, such as those on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, Anti-Dumping Measures, Customs Valuation, Import 
Licensing Procedures and Pre-Shipment Inspection. 
 
106  As described in a WTO publication: 
The notification provisions contained in the [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade] and other agreements relating to trade in goods are 
numerous and diverse . . . .   Some of these are of broad application; for 
example, most WTO rules-based agreements require the notification of 
implementing legislation and any changes to such legislation.  Some of 
these provisions call for notifications on a periodic basis, such as 
biannual reports on countervailing and anti-dumping actions.  Some 
notifications only have to be made when a particular trade action is taken 
or contemplated, such as a safeguard action.  Still others only have to be 
made on a “one-time” basis, for example at the time of the coming into 
force of the WTO Agreement.  Apart from such notification provisions, 
use is also made of other devices for ensuring that the WTO and its 
Members have adequate information about the practices of Members; 
these include requirements to make available enquiry or contact points, 
the possibility for “reverse” notifications to be made by an affected 
Member about another Member’s practices, and obligations to provide 
information on request.   
The Fundamental WTO Principles of National Treatment, supra note 100, ¶ 56. 
107  Provisions on Procedural Fairness in Existing WTO Agreements, supra note 88, 
¶ 5. 
108  Id. ¶ 21. 
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procedural fairness calls for the publication of governmental 
measures of general application and requires that these measures 
are published, as a general rule, before they are applied. 109  In 
addition, the measures should be administered “in a uniform, 
impartial and reasonable manner or in a fair and equitable way”110 
with the possibility for appeal or review of decisions on the 
application of such measures.111 
Proposals by the EU to incorporate these core principles in a 
multilateral framework on competition were opposed strongly by 
many developing countries that were concerned about the 
potential negative implications of the suggestions. 112   They 
questioned the propriety of such incorporation, pointing out that 
the  “principles [are] not universally applicable to all issues, 
developed as they were in the context of the original purpose of 
the GATT as an agreement to facilitate reduction of barriers to 
international trade in goods.”113 
There were concerns that extending the national treatment 
principle to a competition framework “may mean that ‘national 
treatment’ has to be ensured for foreign firms (and their goods and 
services) vis-à-vis local firms in the domestic market”114 and that 
“[s]uch ‘equality’ would only accentuate the inequality in market 
outcomes, since local firms are generally smaller than the large 
foreign firms and transnational corporations (TNCs).” 115  
Moreover, “[i]t would curb the right of developing country 
governments to provide advantages to local firms, and local firms 
themselves may be restricted from practices, which are to their 
advantage.”116  
Some commentators consider the proposals on non-
discrimination to have been part of an attempt to link competition 
policy “to market access, in which foreign firms and their products 
and services should have the right to ‘free competition’ vis-à-vis 
                                                     
109  Id. ¶ 16. 
110  Id. ¶ 16(a)(ii). 
111  Id. 
112  Khor, supra note 10, at 29. 
113  Cecilia Oh, TWN Briefing Paper No. 18: Trade and Competition Policy in 
the WTO, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, at 3 (2003) [hereinafter TWN Briefing Paper 
No. 18], available at http://www.twn.my/title2/briefing_papers/No18.pdf.  
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. at 2. 
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local firms in markets of developing countries.” 117   Under that 
approach, “’[f]ree competition’ would . . . mean that the 
preferences given to local firms, and any advantages or assistance 
they enjoy, should be curtailed or eliminated, so that the foreign 
firms can compete on a level playing field.”118  This would make it 
possible for “the transnational corporations of the US, Europe, 
Japan, etc, . . . to compete on ‘equal ground’ as local companies in 
the local markets.”119  
However, that would be problematic and inequitable because 
the “transnational corporations already enjoy great advantages, 
including big size, large financial resources, high technology, 
marketing networks, and brand names.”120  Therefore,  
 
there is no ‘level playing field’ to begin with [and w]ithout 
some assistance, preferential treatment, or home-ground 
advantages (such as being familiar with the local language 
and customs, and having a distribution system built over 
generations), the local companies of developing countries 
will not be able to survive the competition from foreign 
firms.”121 
 
Developing countries also took issue with the EU proposal that 
the transparency principle cover “all aspects of competition regime 
                                                     
117  Third World Network, EU EPAs: Economic and Social Development 
Implications: The Case of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement 33 
(Feb. 2009) [hereinafter EU EPAs], available at 
http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/twn-
cariforumfeb09.pdf.  As one commentator notes:  
 Policy-makers in major developed countries are advocating the 
introduction of a new agreement on competition policy in the World 
Trade Organisation so that their big corporations will be better able to 
over a large share of the markets of developing countries. Ironically, 
competition policy was originally understood as a means to help small 
companies not to be overwhelmed by the big firms.  But now it is sought 
to be used by the rich countries to help their gain corporations compete 
with the local firms in the developing countries. 
Martin Khor, Developing Countries Resist WTO Agreement on ‘Competition’, THIRD 
WORLD NETWORK, Apr. 1999, available at http://www.twn.my/title/1889-cn.htm. 
118  EU EPAs, supra note 117, at 33. 
119  Id. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. 
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– from legislation, rules and institutional structures to decision-
making processes, including decisions on sectoral exclusions and 
exemptions.” 122   They found this to represent an unwarranted 
extension of the transparency requirement in the WTO, which is 
“limited only to the publication of trade regulations and does not 
extend to decision-making.”123  
Finally, the principle of procedural fairness was seen to pose 
significant difficulties because “developing countries with 
dissimilar legal systems to developed countries, or with 
insufficient resources will run the risk of not meeting the requisite 
standard of procedural fairness,”124 which under the EU proposal 
would guarantee “rights of access to the system of appeal, 
including right to reasoned final decision providing detailed 
grounds on which such decisions were based, and the right of 
parties to be heard.” 125   Moreover, “[n]otions of fundamental 
fairness differ among legal systems and political and legal cultures, 
and there is as yet no broad consensus on the meaning of 
procedural fairness in the context of competition law 
enforcement.”126 
 
3.3. Policy Space of Developing Countries 
 
The talks on competition policy in the WTO collapsed largely 
due to developing country concerns that a multilateral framework 
on competition was not likely to enhance the development 
prospects of their economies and could even have detrimental 
effects due to perceived restrictions the framework would have on 
their policy space to adopt appropriate measures to promote 
economic development.127  As pointed out: 
 
Under the EU’s proposals, a series of policy instruments 
would no longer be available to ACP governments 
                                                     
122  TWN Briefing Paper No. 18, supra note 113, at 3. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
126  Id. 
127  See generally Michael Bailey, Oxfam et al., Unwanted, Unproductive and 
Unbalanced: Six Arguments Against an Investment Agreement at the WTO (2003). 
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including:  monopolies granted by the state, preventing 
resellers from setting prices independently, requiring that 
unrelated products be sold as a package (product sale 
bundling), promoting cartel behavior by a few state-
supported firms, putting high barriers to entry such as 
technical, financial or nationality requirements, 
geographical market restrictions, arbitrary blacklisting, 
price fixing, tied purchasing arrangements, product and 
price dumping.128 
 
In an environment where domestically sourced capital is scarce 
but would be needed to grow a strong and competitive sector,129 
the proposals would have limited the ability of developing country 
governments to support public enterprises through the provision 
of subsidies or adoption of regulatory measures to protect the 
enterprises from premature or undue competition.130 
Moreover, the enforcement of the competition frameworks 
proposed by the EU relies “on the existence of a strong state, with 
adequate institutional, human and financial capacity to conduct 
investigations, monitor markets and sanction prohibited 
practices.” 131   Many developing countries simply lack the 
institutional capacity to implement such policies and it would have 
been “unfair, if not absurd”132 and an unnecessary administrative 
and fiscal burden133 to subject them to the competition disciplines 
of the developed countries.  Thus, for the developing countries, it 
made practical sense to have “far fewer and simpler competition 
rules which are capable of being enforced.”134 
Therefore, it was no surprise that developing countries rejected 
the “one size fits all” approach to competition policy that 
underpinned the proposals brought by Western countries in the 
                                                     
128  Vicente Paolo B. Yu III, South Ctr., Development Challenges of Competition 
Policy in the Economic Partnership Agreements 2 (2007). 
129  Id. 
130  Id. 
131  SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 8, supra note 1, ¶ 17. 
132  Ajit Singh & Rahul Dhumale, Competition Policy, Development and 
Developing Countries 11 (Indian Council for Research on Int’l Econ. Relations, 
Working Paper No. 50, 1999), available at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/FTAs/Singapore%20Issues/Competition/Co
mpetitionPolicy,DevelopmentandDevelopingCountries%20Ajit%20Sin.pdf. 
133 Yu III, supra note 128. 
134  Singh & Dhumale, supra note 132, at 11. 
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WTO.  Instead, they preferred a competition framework tailored to 
their development needs,135 and which would provide sufficient 
policy space to implement measures affecting trade and 
competition, in line with such developmental needs and objectives. 
For example, as one commentator has counseled: 
 
in the early stages of industrialisation, governments may 
wish to promote ‘national champions’, that is, large 
industrial groups which are likely to compete with foreign 
firms both in domestic and possibly in regional markets. 
Hence, governments may want to encourage, at least 
initially or temporarily, some market concentration.  A 
competition policy primarily concerned only with the 
obsessive quest for maximum competition is likely to 
prevent mergers leading to market concentration whereas 
industrial policy objectives might encourage the same 
mergers.  A classic example of a mix of competition policy 
alternating market concentration and rivalry can be found 
in the promotion by the Korean government of national 
chaebols.136 
 
Furthermore, “depending on the stages of development and 
productive capacity of a developing country, governments may 
decide to increase or reduce the level of intra-firm competition, 
hence enforcing more or less strictly competition principles.” 137  
This happened in China, “where industrial policies have alternated 
the promotion or restriction of intra-firm rivalry depending on the 
perception of the vulnerability or strength of firms in the context of 
a strategy for the promotion of a ‘team’ of national champions.”138  
Accordingly, it was prudent for developing countries to reject 
the EU proposals and thereby preserve their policy options with 
respect to intra-firm rivalry and restrictive business practices such 
                                                     
135  For a discussion on the elements of a competition policy framework for 
developing countries, see Sanoussi Bilal, supra note 26, at 9–16; see also Pradeep S. 
Mehta, Competition Policy in Developing Countries: An Asia-Pacific Perspective 75–87 
(Mar. 7, 2010), available at 
http://e.unescap.org/pdd/publications/bulletin2002/ch7.pdf. 
136  SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 8, supra note 1, ¶ 18. 
137  Id. ¶ 19. 
138  Id. 
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as dominant position.139  Specific developmental objectives which 
they are at liberty to pursue as part of their policy space and which 
may be suitable for small and vulnerable economies include: 
creating an optimum level of domestic competition, as opposed to a 
maximum level of competition;140 ensuring coordination between 
competition authorities and legislators and other stakeholders 
active in development promotion;141 safeguarding the propensity 
of firms to invest at high levels;142 and regulating the behavior of 
multi-national corporations which frequently enjoy a dominant 
position in developing country markets. 143   Other suitable 
developmental objectives are regulating how public (state) aid can 
be attributed; 144  securing the policy space needed to support 
national firms or sectors by reserving the right to discriminate 
against foreign economic operators; 145  and ensuring that the 
                                                     
139  Id. ¶ 20. 
140  According to the South Centre, “[t]his optimum level of competition has 
to be balanced against and reflect other policy objectives, such as the promotion of 
local industries and incentives for innovation and R&D.”  Id. ¶ 20(a). 
141  These stakeholders include “agricultural or industrial producers, trade 
unions, agencies responsible for industrial policies or export promotion, as well as 
all other agencies in charge of sectoral policies, e.g. education, fisheries, 
transports, etc.”  Id. ¶ 20(b). 
142 This will entail “protecting [and] encouraging the growth of profits, 
including by coordinating investment decisions and guaranteeing protected 
markets.  In these instances, a certain degree of market concentration may be 
encouraged, rather than punished by competition policy.”  Id. ¶ 20(c). 
143  Because such dominant position can be used to restrict, delay or hinder 
the establishment of national industries, it would be necessary to control any 
abuse of dominant position in a value chain (standards or inputs).  Id. ¶ 20(d). 
144  This will involve  
enumerating the public policy objectives that may justify the use of such 
instruments or identifying priority sectors that need government support 
and encouraging transparency in the attribution and use of such aid – 
but not generally prohibiting the use of state aid, including in cases 
where it encroaches on social policies or the promotion of small and 
medium enterprises. 
Id. ¶ 20(e). 
145  As has been pointed out, 
[w]hile non-discrimination  is  a  legitimate  request among equal 
business players, the reality in most [developing country] economies is 
that markets are already tilted in favour of foreign firms, to the detriment 
of much smaller local entrepreneurs. . . .  For developing countries, 
however, there are sound arguments why discrimination on the basis of 
nationality may be useful.  
Id. ¶ 20(f). 
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competition framework does not require the prohibition or 
privatization of state monopolies or the deregulation and 
liberalization of sectors considered strategic from a developmental 
perspective.146 
 
4. COMPETITION POLICY IN THE  EUROPEAN UNION-
WEST AFRICA EPA NEGOTIATIONS 
4.1. Competition as an Issue in the EPA Negotiations 
 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries are involved in 
negotiations with the EU to replace the existing trade agreement 
governing trading relations between the EU and the ACP (the 
Cotonou Agreement)147 with new trade agreements to be called 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).148  Unsurprisingly, the 
EU has sought to introduce into the negotiations the same elements 
of a multilateral framework on competition that were rejected at 
the WTO.  For example, in its recommendations on June 17, 2002 
authorizing the European Commission to negotiate economic 
partnership agreements with the ACP countries and regions, the 
EU General Affairs Council noted that the EU was seeking a 
regulatory framework based “on principles of non-discrimination, 
openness, transparency and stability and on general principles of 
protection, which will endorse the best results agreed in the 
competent international fora or bilaterally.”149  This section surveys 
the evolution of the competition policy debate in the EPA 
negotiations between the EU and one of the regions, West Africa.150 
                                                     
146  These include education, energy, health, transportation, and finance.  Id. 
¶ 20(g). 
147  Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and Its 
Member States, of the Other Part, Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, Dec. 15, 
2000, L317 O.J. 3 [hereinafter Cotonou Agreement], available at 
http://www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/Cotonou2000.pdf. 
148  See generally SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 1, supra note 2. 
149  Memorandum by Traidcraft Exchange PLC, § 10, WWW.PARLIAMENT.UK, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldeucom/104/10
4we13.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) (delineating memorandum to the UK 
Parliamentary Select Committee on the European Union).  
150  The ACP countries have been divided into six regional groups with each 
group negotiating a separate EPA with the EU.  These regional groups consist of: 
West Africa; East and Southern Africa; Southern African Development 
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The EPA negotiations with West Africa were launched in 
Cotonou in October 2003.151  In their preliminary talks to set the 
agenda for the negotiations, while the EU and West Africa seemed 
to agree on the general objectives for the negotiations, some 
differences emerged regarding the content of the negotiations.152  A 
key point of divergence concerned the order and prioritization of 
the negotiation themes, with West Africa contending there was 
need to first consolidate the integration process and create a 
regional market with EU assistance, before negotiating the content 
of the free trade agreement between the two regions.153  The EU, 
however, had no intention of linking the opening of trade 
negotiations with the completion beforehand of the West African 
integration process. 
Another stumbling block concerned consistency with the 
multilateral negotiations at the WTO, particularly as regards the 
opening of discussions on the Singapore issues, 154  such as 
investment and competition policy.  West Africa rejected the EU 
proposal to negotiate those issues, pointing to the stalemate in the 
WTO regarding the opening of negotiations on those matters.155 
A roadmap setting the timetable for the negotiations was 
adopted156 on August 4, 2004, which reflected some compromises 
in the divergent positions that had emerged.  While the 
consolidation of West African regional integration remained a 
priority, 157  completion of the process was not to be made a 
                                                     
Community (SADC); Central Africa; the Caribbean (CARIFORUM); and the 
Pacific.  
151  Econ. Cmty. of West African States & Eur. Comm’n, Road Map for 
Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations Between West Africa and the European 
Community (2004), ¶ 3 [hereinafter ROADMAP], available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/october/tradoc_118923.pdf.  
152  State of the EPA Negociations [sic] Between West Africa and the European 
Community, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (2005) [hereinafter State of the EPA 
Negotiations], available at 
http://hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/twn_africa_ecowas_eu_epa_status_report.pdf 
(presenting an unpublished memorandum prepared by West Africa’s negotiators 
summarizing key developments after the adoption in August 2004 of a road map 
for the negotiations). 
153  Id. at 1. 
154  Id. at 12. 
155  See infra notes 57–73 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the 
WTO initiative to open negotiations on the Singapore issues. 
156  ROADMAP, supra note 151, ¶ 5. 
157  Id. ¶ 7. 
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precondition to the trade negotiations.  On the matter of the 
Singapore issues, West Africa agreed only to discuss with the EU 
its regional integration process and to explore arrangements 
concerning competition and investment that would be relevant to 
such process.158  Significantly, barely 3 days before the adoption of 
the roadmap, the WTO had resolved on August 1, 2004 to drop the 
issue of competition from the Doha agenda, and therefore, not to 
pursue discussions for the adoption of a multilateral framework on 
competition.  Apparently, the WTO decision had a predictable 
effect on the scope of the EPA negotiations. 
The roadmap identified two objectives relevant to discussions 
on competition policy within the framework of EPA negotiations.  
The first was “facilitation of an enabling environment for 
investment to mobilise internal resources and also promote the 
inflow of foreign capital, particularly by ensuring transparent, 
stable and feasible conditions”159 and the second, “[t]he adoption 
of a Community legal framework on competition to remedy the 
issue of anti-competition practices in the region.”160  Preparatory 
activities ahead of the EPA negotiations were identified to include 
the “definition, at the appropriate time, of objectives and 
procedures for investment, competition and intellectual 
property” 161  and the “formulation of proposals for capacity 
building and other support measures in . . . competition . . . 
policies.”162  
                                                     
158  State of the EPA Negotiations, supra note 152, at 2. 
159  ROADMAP, supra note 151, ¶ 22. 
160  Id. ¶ 22. 
161  Id. ¶ 45. 
162  The other preparatory activities for the negotiations involved:  
[i] definition of the EPA reference framework with regard to the 
technical barriers to trade and SPS measures, customs procedure and 
trade facilitation, with a view to ensuring free movement of goods within 
the region and between the region and the European Union; [ii] 
harmonisation of the policies on standardisation, certification and SPS 
measures; [iii] definition of a reference framework for border protection 
measures (customs tariffs and other measures); . . . [iv] definition of the 
general structure of the EPA (areas to be covered by the EPA); [v] 
conduct of the analyses of different liberalisation options for trade in 
goods and services; [vi] formulation of proposals for capacity building 
and other support measures in the various areas open to negotiation 
[such as] border protection measures, technical barriers to trade and SPS 
measures, . . . competition and intellectual property policies; and [vii] 
negotiation of the timeframe for liberalisation and the conclusion of the 
EPA.   
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An indicative schedule for the negotiations designated the 
period April 2005–September 2005 for work on the definition of the 
objectives and procedures related to investments, competition and 
intellectual property. 163   Two technical meetings were to be 
organized to identify objectives and implementation procedures 
with regard to investment, competition and intellectual property 
policies, as well as their link with the harmonization process in the 
West African region. 164   It was also agreed that a Regional 
Preparatory Task Force 165  would meet to make proposals on 
capacity building in these areas and the support needed for the 
successful completion of the harmonization process, in line with 
the objectives of the EPA.166  In accordance with this plan, five 
thematic groups, including one on Investment and Competition, 
were established after the adoption of the roadmap to work out 
negotiation strategies for the EPAS. 
In April 2006, a West African regional body comprising trade 
ministers and representatives from the West African countries 
resolved that competition issues should be removed from the EPA 
process and instead, the focus should be on harmonizing the 
competition policies of ECOWAS member states into a common 
                                                     
Id. 
163  Id. ¶ 63. 
164  Id. 
165  The Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) is a joint structure between 
West Africa and the European Union created “to facilitate the links and coherence 
between cooperation for development funding and the EPA.”  ROADMAP, supra 
note 151, ¶ 53.  “On the West African side, the RPTF comprises the representatives 
of the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, the UEMOA Commission and the National 
Authorising Officers responsible for [the European Development Fund].”  Id. 
166  The specific objectives of the RPTF are to  
contribute to the efficient delivery of support to the West African region 
in its preparation, negotiation and implementation of the EPA and 
notably for the: [a] [i]dentification and evaluation of existing support 
measures that can respond to needs that are jointly agreed by the 
negotiators; [b] [p]reparation of pre-identification projects/programme 
sheets to be forwarded to the structures in charge of development 
cooperation financing, in accordance with the provisions of the Cotonou 
Agreement, based on the different support measures agreed upon by the 
negotiators, and particularly those needed to implement the EPA 
reference framework for the region and the West African countries; [c] 
[s]uggestions for the sourcing of financing from the European Union for 
the projects and programmes and proposals for their effective 
implementation.  
Id. ¶ 54. 
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code, as was envisaged in the roadmap.167  In accordance with this 
decision, the West African strategy now centered on seeking 
cooperation from the EU in regards to the region’s own program 
on competition, rather than the establishment and enforcement of a 
common competition regulatory framework under the EPA.  
 
4.2. EU Proposals to West Africa 
 
On April 4, 2007, the EU formally presented its proposals for 
the EPA negotiations to West Africa. 168   The chapter on 
competition provided that the parties would “recognise the 
importance of free and undistorted competition in their trade 
relations . . . [and] acknowledge that anti-competitive business 
practices have the potential to distort the proper functioning of 
markets and generally undermine the benefits of trade 
liberalization.”169  Consequently, they would agree that the certain 
practices restricting competition would be incompatible with the 
proper functioning of the EPA Agreement.170  The first group was 
identified to include “agreements and concerted practices between 
undertakings, which have the object or effect of substantially 
preventing or lessening competition in the territory of the 
European Community or of the West African Party as a whole or in 
a substantial part thereof.” 171   The second type concerned the 
“abuse by one or more undertakings of market power in the 
territory of the European Community or of the West African Party 
as a whole or in a substantial part thereof.”172 
In addition, the Parties would be required to maintain laws 
addressing restrictions on competition within their jurisdictions, 
and designate a body for the implementation of such laws and 
regulations.173  A Party that did not have such laws or body in 
place as of the entry into force of the EPA agreement, would have 
                                                     
167  ROADMAP, supra note 151, ¶ 22. 
168  Eur. Comm’n, EC Working Document: Economic Partnership Agreement 
Between the West African States, ECOWAS and UEMOA, of the One Part, and the 
European Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part (Apr. 4, 2007). 
169  Id. art. 2(1). 
170  Id. 
171  Id. art. 2(1)(a). 
172  Id. art. 2(1)(b). 
173  Id. art. 3(1). 
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five years to do so.174  Significantly, the EU proposals incorporated 
by reference, as part of the definition of competition laws, 
“[a]rticles 81, 82 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, and their implementing regulations or 
amendments.”175 
With regard to public enterprises and enterprises to which 
special or exclusive rights have been granted, the Parties would 
 
ensure that . . . there is neither enacted nor maintained any 
measure distorting trade in goods or services between the 
Parties to an extent contrary to the Parties interest, and that 
such enterprises shall be subject to the rules of competition 
in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct 
the performance, in law or in fact or the particular tasks 
assigned to them.176   
 
Also, the Parties would  
 
progressively adjust . . . any State monopolies of a 
commercial nature character, so as to ensure that, by the 
end of the [fifth] year following the entry into force of [the 
EPA] Agreement, no discrimination regarding the 
conditions under which goods are procured and marketed 
[would] exist[] between nationals of the EU Member States 
and those of the West African States.177 
 
 Furthermore, the Joint EPA Council would be informed about the 
measures adopted to implement this objective.178  
The EU proposals contained provisions for the exchange of 
information and cooperation in connection with enforcement and 
capacity building.  For example, the competition authority of one 
Party could inform its counterpart in the other Party about its 
willingness to co-operate with respect to enforcement matters, but 
                                                     
174  Id. art. 3(2). 
175  Id. art. 1(3)(a). 
176  Id. art. 5(2). 
177  Id. art. 5(3). 
178  Id. 
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such cooperation would not compromise their independence.179  
The competition authorities could also exchange non-confidential 
information, subject to the standards of confidentiality of each 
Party.180 
 
4.3. Draft Joint Text 
 
The working document used as the basis for the EPA 
negotiations is referred to as the Draft Joint Text,181 and it is the text 
of the original EU proposals which was revised to delete 
provisions with respect to which there was no mutual agreement 
to proceed with negotiations as well as to capture West Africa’s 
proposals.  The chapter on competition in the Draft Joint Text is 
captioned “cooperation on competition” 182 instead of  
“competition” as contained in the EU’s original proposals.  It 
retains as “incompatible with the smooth operation of [the 
EPA]”183 the two groups of anti-competitive activities previously 
identified in the EU proposals 184  and adds two new ones 
concerning “[a]ny state aid leading to a distortion to competition or 
threat thereof by favouring some companies over others,”185 and 
“[a]nti-trust practices imputable to the member states of their 
respective communities.”186  However, no obligation is imposed on 
the Parties to prohibit such anti-competitive acts within the 
framework of the EPA. 
Significantly, the EU proposal for the adoption of competition 
rules and establishment of a competition authority within 5 years 
of the entry into force of the EPA has been dropped from the Draft 
Joint Text.  Instead, there is provision to the effect that:  “[w]ith a 
                                                     
179  Id. art. 4(1). 
180  Id. art. 4(2). 
181  EPA Draft Text: Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) Between the 
West African States, ECOWAS and UEMOA, on the One Part and the European 
Community and Its Members States, on the Other Part (Sept. 17, 2010) [hereinafter 
Draft Joint Text] (on file with Author) (presenting the draft text that is the result of 
negotiations in Brussels, Belgium, referred to as the Draft Joint Text).   
182  Id. tit. IV, ch. 1 (discussing trade in Title IV: Trade-Related Areas, in 
chapter 1, entitled “Cooperation on Competition”).  
183  Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 1. 
184  See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text. 
185  Draft Joint Text, supra note 181, tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 1(1)(iii).  
186  Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 1(1)(iv).   
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view to limiting the adverse effects and repercussions of the anti-
competitive practices . . . , the two Parties [would] strive to set up a 
cooperation framework for the promotion and implementation of 
healthy and effective anti-competitive policies and rules.”187 
The specific areas of cooperation agreed to in the Draft Joint 
Text include the EU’s support to the West Africa region for the 
establishment of national and regional competition regulatory 
frameworks, 188  capacity building of national and regional 
authorities, 189  and the training of judicial and other personnel 
responsible for the regulation and control of competition in the 
West Africa region. 190   Other areas of cooperation involve the 
management of disputes arising from the application of 
competition rules, 191  exchange of information on official aid 
regimes such as subsidies,192 and information on anti-competitive 
practices observed on their respective territories 193  as well as 
assistance to combat the anti-competitive practices of 
multinationals.194  
The Draft Joint Text also excludes the rules regarding State 
enterprises introduced in the original EU proposals.195  Instead, it 
notes that “[n]o provision [in the EPA] may be interpreted as 
prohibiting a Party from granting special or exclusive rights, 
delegating or maintaining state or private monopolies in 
conformity with legislation.” 196   However, the Parties are to 
“ensure that state enterprises and those accorded special rights are 
subjected to competition rules, insofar as their application does not 
impinge on the de facto and de jure accomplishment of the special 
tasks assigned them.”197 
Significantly, the provisions of the Draft Joint Text on 
competition focus exclusively on a cooperation framework and do 
not include the core principles of non-discrimination and 
                                                     
187  Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 1(2).   
188  Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(a). 
189  Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(b). 
190  Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(c). 
191  Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(d). 
192  Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(e). 
193  Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(f). 
194  Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(g). 
195  See supra notes 176–78 and accompanying text. 
196  Draft Joint Text, supra note 181, tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 3(1).   
197  Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 3(2).   
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transparency originally proposed by the EU in the WTO for 
incorporation in multilateral competition policies and 
subsequently endorsed in the EU’s initial EPA proposals. 
Therefore, if the competition-related provisions of the Draft Joint 
Text were to be adopted in a final EPA without modification, they 
would not adversely affect the policy space of West African 
governments to implement competition policies that reflect their 
specific developmental needs.  
 
5. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION:  A REGIONAL 
COMPETITION FRAMEWORK 
5.1. Regional Priorities 
 
With the refusal of West African negotiators to discuss 
substantive commitments on competition policy, priority in the 
region turned to the harmonization of the policies of ECOWAS 
Member States “within the context of the formulation of a 
community regulatory framework on competition.” 198   This 
stemmed from the recognition that on-going efforts to promote 
regional economic growth would be enhanced by the adoption of a 
sound regional framework for competition. 199   Indeed, regional 
policy makers characterized competition policy as a “necessary 
complement to trade policy and as such should be a central part of 
the ECOWAS system.”200  They justified the adoption of a regional 
competition policy as follows: 
 
A well designed and vigorously enforced regional 
competition regulation framework will help to concretely 
deliver on the goals of the ECOWAS integration strategy, 
by reducing the risk of trade disputes and policies of trade 
defences, contributing to increased productivity and 
economic growth, and ultimately raising the standard of 
living of the citizens of the Community.  Furthermore, the 
                                                     
198  ECOWAS, Regional Competition Policy Framework (2007), at 2, available at 
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/actes_add_commerce/1.Regional_Com
petition_Policy_Framework-final-P.pdf. 
199  Id. at 3. 
200  Id. at 5. 
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development of a region-wide competition policy and 
regulation will enhance the Community’s ability to 
confront and address anti-competitive behavior by foreign 
firms, provide a basis for involvement and cooperation on 
negotiations regarding competition matters at the  
multilateral level, and establish a basis for the development 
of institutional competence on competition law for the 
region.201 
 
Thus, even though West Africa was not keen about negotiating 
competition policy in the context of the EPA, it nevertheless found 
a competition policy specifically adapted to regional needs 
priorities to be useful and supportive of the regional integration 
programs instituted by ECOWAS.  In furtherance of these 
objectives, work on a regional instrument was begun and resulted 
in draft text, which was adopted on December 19, 2008 by the 
ECOWAS Heads of State as the Supplementary Act Adopting 
Community Competition Rules and the Modalities of their 




The objectives of the Supplementary Act are to promote 
competition and enhance economic efficiency, prohibit anti-
competitive business conduct, promote consumer welfare and 
expand opportunities for domestic enterprises to participate in 
world markets. 203   The Supplementary Act prohibits as 
incompatible with the ECOWAS Common Market “all agreements 
between enterprises, decisions  by associations of enterprises and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between ECOWAS 
Member States and the object or effect of which are or  may be the 
prevention, restriction, distortion or elimination of competition 
                                                     
201  Id. 
202  ECOWAS, Supplementary Act A/SA.1/06/08 Adopting Community 
Competition Rules and the Modalities of Their Application Within ECOWAS 
(2008), available at 
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/actes_add_commerce/2.Supplementar
y_Act_on_competition_rules-final-P.pdf. 
203  Id. art. 4(2)(d). 
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within the Common Market.”204  These include price fixing and 
measures that limit or control production, share markets, 
customers, or sources of supply, applying dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, or “mak[ing] the 
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts.”205  Any agreement or decision prohibited as being in 
restraint of trade is “automatically void and of no legal effect in 
any Member State of the ECOWAS Community.”206 
Also prohibited is any abuse 207  of a dominant position by 
enterprises within the ECOWAS Common Market.208  Under the 
Supplementary Act, enterprises hold a dominant position in a 
relevant market if, “singularly or collectively, it/they possess a 
substantial share of the market that enables it/them to control 
prices or to exclude competition.” 209   Similarly, there is a 
prohibition of mergers, takeovers, joint ventures, or business 
combinations where the resultant market share in the ECOWAS 
Common Market attributable to any good, service, line of 
commerce, or activity affecting commerce leads to an abuse of 
dominant market position resulting in a substantial reduction of 
competition.210  Although such structures would automatically be 
void and of no effect in any Member State of ECOWAS,211 they 
could qualify for exemption “if the transaction concerned [was] in 
                                                     
204  Id. art. 5(1). 
205  Id. art. 5(1)(e). 
206  Id. art. 5(2). 
207  The prohibited abuses include:  
(a) limiting access to a relevant market or otherwise unduly restraining 
competition; (b) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other unfair trading conditions; (c) limiting production, markets 
or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (d) applying 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) making 
the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other  parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.   
Id. art. 6(2). 
208  Id. art. 6(2). 
209  Id. art. 6(1). 
210  Id. art. 7(1). 
211  Id. art. 7(2). 
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the public interest.”212 
Unless exempted under the Supplementary Act, aid granted by 
a Member State that “distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favoring certain enterprises or the production of certain goods”213 
is considered to be incompatible with the ECOWAS Common 
Market.  However, State aid would be considered compatible if it is 
of a social character and is granted to individual consumers 
without discrimination as to the origin of the products 
concerned, 214  or if it is for the purpose of remedying damage 
caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences.215 
State aid that may be considered to be compatible includes aid 
given to promote socio-economic development in areas with 
exceptionally low standard of living or serious underemployment; 
to support culture and heritage conservation efforts and important 
projects of Community interest; to facilitate the development of 
certain economic activities or areas; or to remedy a serious 
disturbance in  the economy of a Member State.216  It also includes 
other categories of aid designated as compatible by decisions of the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government on the 
recommendation of the Council of Ministers acting on proposals 
from the ECOWAS Competition Authority.217  
Public enterprises granted special or exclusive rights are 
subject to the competition rules, and Member States are therefore 
to refrain from enacting or maintaining in force any measure with 
regard to such enterprises that are contrary to the provisions of the 
Supplementary Act. 218   However, an exception is made for 
“enterprises entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing 
monopoly” which would be subject to the competition rules, only 
in so far as their application “does not obstruct the performance, in 
law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.” 219  In 
addition, to trigger the competition rules, the adverse effects of the 
activities of the public enterprises on the “development of trade 
                                                     
212  Id. art. 7(3). 
213  Id. art. 8(1). 
214  Id. art. 8(2)(b). 
215  Id. art. 8(2)(b). 
216  Id. art. 8(3). 
217  Id. art. 8(3). 
218  Id. art. 9(1). 
219  Id. art. 9(2). 
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must be . . . [to] such an extent as would be contrary to the interests 
of ECOWAS Community.”220 
Finally, the Regional Competition Authority created to oversee 
the implementation of the Supplementary Act 221  has power to 
exempt from the competition rules, agreements, decisions or 
practices otherwise in restraint of trade which contribute “to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress” 222  and to authorize mergers, 
acquisitions, or business combinations otherwise prohibited by the 
competition rules “if the transaction . . . [was] in the public 
interest.”223 The Regional Competition Authority also has power to 
authorize persons to enter into agreements or engage in practices 
that would violate the competition rules,224 and victims of anti-
competitive practices may apply to it for compensation for losses 




This paper has traced the competition policy issue from its 
introduction by the EU in the WTO to its resurrection in the 
context of the EPA negotiations.  The paper also noted the refusal 
of West Africa to negotiate specific commitments on competition.  
However, in the interim, and as part of a bid to enhance its 
program of regional integration, ECOWAS has adopted a regional 
competition framework that improves the regulatory environment 
and preserves sufficient policy space for governments to pursue 
suitable development objectives. 
The ECOWAS Supplementary Act covers the traditional areas 
reflected in the antitrust laws of the US and the competition policy 
of the EU, including agreements and concerted practices in 
                                                     
220  Id. 
221  Id. art. 13(1). 
222  Id. art. 11(1)(iii).  However, to qualify for exemption, the measures must 
not allow consumers a “fair share of the resulting benefit,” and not “ impose on 
the concerned enterprises, restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives;” or “afford such enterprises the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in 
question.”  Id. art. 11(1)(iii).  
223  Id. art. 11(2). 
224  Id. art. 11(3). 
225  Id. art. 10(1). 
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restraint of trade,226 abuse of dominant position227 and mergers and 
acquisitions.228  However, unlike those regulatory frameworks, the 
ECOWAS Supplementary Act contains additional provisions on 
state aid229 and public enterprises230 which are couched in flexible 
language that preserves sufficient policy space for West African 
governments to pursue developmental policies that may require 
the grant of special preferences to individuals and groups.  Thus, 
state aid of a social character given without discrimination as to 
origin of products, or for development in economically depressed 
areas or for other priority regional economic projects, would be 
considered compatible with the Supplementary Act. 231  
Furthermore, the provisions on public enterprises exempt such 
enterprises from the application of competition rules where such 
application would “obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of 
the particular tasks assigned to them.”232  In effect, enforcement of 
ECOWAS competition rules can be relaxed where they would 
interfere with the performance of the public enterprises.  
Moreover, the Regional Competition is empowered to exempt 
certain anti-competitive acts that are desirable233 or considered to 
be in the public interest.234 
Significantly, the Supplementary Act does not mention the 
principles of national treatment, most-favored nation treatment, 
transparency or fairness of procedures.  The omission is a stark 
rejection of the arguments that were made to support 
incorporating the WTO core principles into a binding multilateral 
competition policy. 235   The Supplementary Act permits the 
governments of ECOWAS countries to craft economic policies that 
aim at specific developmental objectives including creating an 
optimum as opposed to a maximum level of competition; 236 
regulating the behavior of multinational corporations; supporting 
                                                     
226  Id. art. 5. 
227  Id. art. 6. 
228  Id. art. 7. 
229  Id. art. 8 
230  Id. art. 9. 
231  Id. arts. 8(2), (3). 
232  Id. art. 9(2). 
233  Id. art. 11(1)(iii). 
234  Id. art. 11(2). 
235  Infra notes 73–93 and accompanying text. 
236  EU EPAs, supra note 117, at 30. 
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national firms or sectors by reserving the right to discriminate 
against foreign economic operators; or resisting demands to 
prohibit or privatize state monopolies or deregulate and liberalize 
sectors considered strategic from a developmental perspective such 
as education, energy, health, transportation, or finance.237 
As of the time of writing, West Africa and the EU are reported 
to have agreed on the text of a partial EPA agreement covering 
goods only, after compromises were found on a number of 
outstanding critical issues, such as degree of market opening by 
West Africa, development assistance, most favored nation 
treatment for European goods, rules of origin and EU agricultural 
subsidies.238  During the negotiations, the EU proposed a specific 
rendez-vous clause that envisaged future negotiations sometime 
after the adoption of the partial EPA on the content of binding 
commitments on competition policy.  However, West Africa 
rejected the EU proposal, and countered with a far more general 
provision that would simply require the parties to reconvene after 
the adoption of the partial EPA to discuss whether to pursue 
negotiations in additional areas, including competition and if so, to 
determine at such future time the scope and modalities for the 
negotiations. 
Given that the areas covered by the ECOWAS Supplementary 
Act are quite comprehensive and adequately cover the well-
established competition rules recognized in most of the 
jurisdictions in the world including the US and the EU, it does not 
appear that there are any benefits to be gained by holding 
                                                     
237  The following examples are quite instructive. 
For instance, a case where two large domestic companies are allowed to 
merge so that they reach economies of scale to compete with other firms 
at the regional or international level, whereas the same merge involving 
one domestic firm and a multinational firm may need to be prohibited to 
avoid a concentration of market power.  An additional example is where 
a government seeks to promote small and medium enterprises through 
specific benefits and defines an eligibility criteria based on sales or profit 
thresholds that de facto exclude foreign firms (although de juris such 
firms were not facially excluded on the basis of nationality).  Finally, 
another example concerns the promotion of export activity, where, by 
definition, only domestic firms may be targeted, since foreign 
competitors are already international.  
Id. at 31 (internal quotations omitted) (footnote omitted).  
238  EPA: West Africa and the EU Conclude a Deal, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & 
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negotiations on competition policy in the context of the EPA.  It 
may therefore not be useful for West Africa to pursue discussions 
on matters that go beyond the areas of cooperation in respect of 
competition policy already identified in the Draft Joint EPA.  
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